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Abstract
In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we investigate the security claims of a
recently proposed RFID authentication protocol. We exhibit a ﬂaw which has gone unnoticed in RFID
protocol literature and present the resulting attacks on authentication, untraceability, and desynchronization
resistance. We analyze and discuss the authors’ proofs of security. References to other vulnerable protocols
are given.
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1 Introduction
Radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) systems aim to identify tags to readers in an
open environment where neither visual nor physical contact is needed for commu-
nication. Because of their low production costs [37] and small size, RFID tags are
expected to replace traditional identiﬁcation methods such as bar codes. Currently,
RFID tags are used, for instance, in passports [17], access control cards for public
transportation [40], and location tracking systems [24,29].
These examples show that RFID tags, as opposed to bar codes, are not only
used to identify objects or people, but also to authenticate them. Such applications,
however, raise privacy concerns, in particular the worry that people may become
traceable by carrying RFID-equipped objects. But attaining strong authentication
while guaranteeing untraceability of RFID tags is a delicate task. The computa-
tional limitations of RFID tags impose signiﬁcant restrictions on the number and
type of cryptographic primitives that can be implemented on them. Moreover, au-
thentication and untraceability have contradictory features. In a communication
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with an RFID reader, a tag’s messages need to convey suﬃcient information for the
reader to be able to authenticate the tag, without revealing anything that would al-
low an adversary to identify the tag. Additionally, to make large-scale deployment
possible, the RFID reader must be able to eﬃciently identify and authenticate
the tag using the supplied information. Consequently, there is a wide variety of
proposed solutions for RFID protocols satisfying these contradictory requirements.
Some recent proposals towards strongly secure, untraceable, and eﬃcient protocols
within today’s resource limitations for RFID tags are [9,10,25,28,39,41]. However,
there is also a signiﬁcant number of publications breaking such protocols, for in-
stance [3,4,6,7,8,15,36], indicating that the design of resource-constrained RFID
protocols satisfying all these requirements is still not well-understood.
In this paper we report on the security of the RFID authentication protocol pro-
posed in [14], which we will call HMNB after the last names of the authors. This
protocol is interesting for several reasons. While there is a trend in recently proposed
RFID protocols to use non-standard constructions, such as operators with algebraic
properties [4,26,39], custom-made hash functions [9], and even resource-constrained
public key cryptography [27] to achieve the mentioned RFID protocol requirements
(albeit unsuccessfully, as shown in [7]), the HMNB protocol uses only standard tech-
niques. Notwithstanding, a simple ﬂaw in the protocol leads to the compromisation
of three design goals: authentication, untraceability, and desynchronization resis-
tance. Moreover, as discussed in the concluding section, the resulting attacks on
this protocol are diﬀerent from attacks on RFID protocols that have been described
before.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we explain our terminology and
describe the HMNB protocol. In Section 3 we exhibit an authentication ﬂaw in
HMNB. In Section 4 we show an attack on untraceability. In Section 5 we show a
desynchronization attack and a related untraceability attack, and in Section 6 we
conclude with a comparison of our attacks to typical attacks on these properties
and give an outlook on future work.
2 Protocol Description
We begin by explaining our terminology and adversary model and then proceed
with the description of the HMNB protocol.
In the following, reader refers to the actual RFID reader as well as the database
communicating with the reader, since this communication takes place over a secure
channel. An agent can be a tag or a reader, while a role refers to the protocol steps
a tag or reader is expected to carry out. A run is the execution of a role by an
agent.
We assume a standard Dolev-Yao intruder model [11] in which the adversary
“controls the network.” More precisely, we assume that the adversary may eaves-
drop on any message exchanged between tag and reader, modify any message sent
from tag to reader or vice versa, and may inject his own messages making them
look like they were sent by tag or reader. We note that there might be attacks
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Table 1
Reader’s veriﬁcation and update procedure in the HMNB protocol
Tag response Update
h(ID), nt ID′ := ID; ID := h(ID, nr); HID := h(ID)
h(ID, nt, nr), nt ID′ := ID; ID := h(ID, nr); HID := h(ID)
h(ID′, nt, nr), nt ID := h(ID′, nr); HID := h(ID)
other reject tag
in this model which are not feasible in a real-world RFID system. Additionally,
the feasibility of attacks does not only depend on the intruder model, but also on
the circumstances under which a system is used. Therefore, for each of the attacks
presented in the following sections, we explain a scenario in which it can be carried
out. When describing an explicit attack scenario, we speak of one or more attackers
carrying out the attack. Thus the single theoretical adversary embodies one or more
real attackers.
The HMNB protocol aims to mutually authenticate RFID tag and reader, keep
the tag untraceable, and resist a particular form of denial-of-service attacks, known
as desynchronization attacks. Furthermore, it has been designed with limited com-
putational requirements on tags in mind employing a hash function as the only
cryptographic primitive. Reader eﬃciency is addressed as described in the follow-
ing.
The protocol assumes that the reader R and tag T share a secret ID, which
is updated at the end of a successful protocol execution. For eﬃciency reasons,
the reader also stores the hash of the ID in HID and the value of ID before the
last update in ID′. Additionally, the tag keeps track of whether its last run ended
successfully or not. For this purpose, the variable S is used. Thus the protocol is
stateful.
The protocol starts with the reader challenging the tag with a nonce nr. The
tag then generates a nonce nt. The response of the tag depends on the value of
S. In case the previous run ended successfully, the value of S is 0 and the tag
responds with (h(ID), nt) allowing the reader to look up the tag in constant time.
In case it did not end successfully, the value of S is 1 and the tag responds with
(h(ID, nt, nr), nt). This case should occur only rarely. In either case, the tag sets
S to 1. The reader accepts the tag if the response, aside from the nonce nt, is equal
to HID, h(ID, nt, nr), or h(ID′, nt, nr) for any stored value of HID, ID or ID′.
The reader then updates the information for the tag according to Table 1 and sends
h(ID′, nt) to the tag. Finally, if the received message matches h(ID, nt), the tag
replaces its ID by h(ID, nr) and sets S to 0. The protocol is depicted as a message
sequence chart in Figure 1.
The message sequence chart shows the role names, framed, near the top of the
chart. Above the role names, the role’s secret terms are shown. Actions, such as
nonce generation, computation, veriﬁcation of terms, and assignments are shown in
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ID, ID′,HID
R
ID,S
T
nonce nr
nr
nonce nt
if S = 0 then P := h(ID)
else P := h(ID,nt, nr)
S := 1
P, nt
verify P, nt
update ID, ID′,HID
Q := h(ID′, nt)
Q
if Q = h(ID,nt) then
ID := h(ID,nr), S := 0
Fig. 1. The HMNB protocol
boxes. Messages to be sent and expected to be received are speciﬁed above arrows
connecting the roles. It is assumed that an agent continues the execution of its run
only if it receives a message conforming to the speciﬁcation.
3 Authentication
When dealing with authentication properties, one needs to ﬁrst make precise what
particular form of authentication is considered. In terms of Lowe’s authentication
hierarchy [33], we consider recent aliveness to be the most appropriate authentica-
tion requirement for RFID protocols. Recent aliveness captures the fact that the
tag needs to have generated a message as a consequence of a reader’s query. More
formally, a protocol guarantees to an agent a in role A that any corresponding agent
b in role B has been recently alive, if and only if, whenever a completes a run, there
has been an event of b during that run.
Note that a weaker authentication property than recent aliveness would need to
have a weaker recentness requirement. Thus, one would get a notion of aliveness
which merely guarantees that a tag has ever been alive. In that case, a replay attack
would not invalidate the security claim. Since for the protocol under consideration
the replay attack is explicitly stated to be undesirable, we conclude that the authors
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intended an authentication notion which is at least as strong as recent aliveness.
3.1 The attack
It is well-known that in order to establish recent aliveness in a challenge-response
protocol, the challenge and response must be related [1,13,21,22]. Observe, however,
that if no messages are blocked or lost in the HMNB protocol, the tag always
responds to a reader’s challenge with h(ID) which does not depend on the challenge.
While this construction allows for an eﬃcient lookup by the reader, if a tag is in
state S = 0, the protocol does not provide tag authentication. An adversary can
impersonate any tag which is in state S = 0 by sending a query to it and replaying
the tag’s response to a reader before the tag has been queried by an authorized
reader. In a scenario where tags are used for access control, an adversary could use
a rogue reader to query several tags. Out of a suﬃciently large number of tags, it
is very likely that there will be several tags which are in state S = 0. In fact, the
protocol is designed with the assumption that most tags will be in state S = 0. If
the adversary times the attack properly, for instance by querying tags when people
are leaving a restricted area or returning items under access control, it is likely that
the adversary will be able to replay the captured messages to the authorized reader
before the victims’ tags return into the reader’s vicinity.
To physically mount this attack the attacker may install a reader in a place where
he expects to be able to query a tag he wants to impersonate. The attacker’s reader
does not have to adhere to oﬃcial regulations that limit the communication range of
RFID systems. Since there need not be physical contact or even a clear line-of-sight
between the reader and the tag, the communication is likely to go unnoticed by the
holder of the tag. After receiving the tag’s response, the attacker can build a tag
that sends the captured response when queried by a legitimate reader.
We have found the same type of ﬂaw in several other protocols. The protocols
in [12,30,31,32] are also challenge-response-based protocols in which the response
does not depend on the challenge. Therefore, these protocols contain a similar au-
thentication ﬂaw, which has hitherto gone unnoticed and is illustrated in a technical
report [7].
3.2 The ﬂaw in the security analysis
In the basic security analysis of HMNB, it is ﬁrst established that the adversary
cannot compute the tag’s ID from observed messages and it is stated that h(ID)
cannot be computed without knowledge of ID. The authors then use the fact that
ID is updated at the end of the protocol to claim that the adversary’s knowledge
of h(ID) is useless for impersonating a tag. The idea behind this reasoning is that
the adversary may observe h(ID) during a communication between a tag and a
reader, but still cannot use it to impersonate the tag, because tag and reader will
have updated the value of ID at the end of their communication.
This reasoning is only valid as long as h(ID) cannot be observed by the adversary
in absence of a trusted reader. As the attack in the preceding section shows, the
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adversary can simply query a tag to obtain h(ID). If no trusted reader is present,
then there is no communication between tag and reader, thus the reader will not
update ID. Therefore the adversary may use h(ID) to impersonate the tag.
4 Untraceability
The ubiquity and wireless communication capability of RFID tags facilitate and
encourage their tracing through space and time. From a privacy perspective this is
highly undesirable. Intuitively, a protocol provides untraceability if an adversary is
not able to recognize a tag he has previously observed. For stateful protocols, such
as HMNB, it follows that the adversary should not be able to observe in which state
a certain tag is.
Formal deﬁnitions of the untraceability notion have been proposed in [3,6,19].
HMNB has been claimed to be untraceable based on the deﬁnition in [19], where
untraceability is deﬁned in terms of privacy experiments. Such an RFID privacy
experiment consists of two phases. In the learning phase, the adversary A may
initiate a communication with the reader R (ReaderInit) or tags T (TagInit),
after which he may interact with them. The reader and tags respond according to
their protocol speciﬁcation. In the challenge phase the adversary chooses two tag
candidates Ti and Tj. Then one of these tags is selected at random (referred to as
T ∗) and A is given access to this tag. The adversary may again interact with the
reader and the tags and must then decide whether the selected tag is Ti or Tj . If
the adversary has a non-negligible advantage in successfully guessing the selected
tag, the protocol is not untraceable. To show untraceability using this deﬁnition, a
standard indistinguishability proof is given.
The authors of HMNB claim that their protocol provides untraceability, be-
cause the tag never sends the same response twice. They provide a formal proof
for untraceability using the strong privacy deﬁnition of [19] explained above. In the
following, we ﬁrst show that the protocol is not untraceable by providing an algo-
rithm that gives the adversary a non-negligible advantage of guessing the selected
tag. We then discuss the ﬂaw in the security analysis of HMNB.
4.1 The attack
In the HMNB protocol, the tag’s response to an RFID reader’s challenge depends
on the state the tag is in at the beginning of the protocol. Recall that the tag’s state
is represented by S. If S = 0 the tag responds with h(ID), nt and otherwise the
tag responds with h(ID, nr, nt), nt. Because the adversary does not know ID, he
can not conclude from the tag’s response in which state the tag was. The adversary
may, however, take advantage of the reader’s ability to distinguish between the two
states. If the tag was in state S = 0 at the beginning of the protocol, the reader
cannot verify whether the value of the nonce nt has changed during transmission.
Thus, an accidental or malicious modiﬁcation of nt does not result in a rejection of
the tag’s response by the reader. The reader completes its run by sending the third
message of the protocol. If the tag was in state S = 1, the reader uses nt, its own
T. van Deursen, S. Radomirovic´ / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 244 (2009) 41–5246
nonce nr, and ID to compute a hash value and compare it with the received one.
In this case, a modiﬁcation of nt can be detected and leads to a rejection of the
tag’s response and an early termination of the protocol execution by the reader.
In terms of the privacy experiments, the strategy of the adversary is therefore
as follows. In the learning phase, two tags Ti and Tj are selected and tag Ti is put
into state S = 1. The adversary can do this by challenging Ti and terminating
the protocol before sending the third message. The learning phase is formalized by
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (Learning phase)
A chooses a pair of distinct tags Ti and Tj uniformly at random.
A initiates communication with R using ReaderInit and obtains challenge nr.
A initiates communication with Ti using TagInit.
A sends nr to Ti.
In the challenge phase, the adversary performs a man-in-the-middle attack. He
obtains a challenge from the reader and sends it to the tag to obtain a response.
He then replaces the nonce provided by the tag with a diﬀerent value and submits
the response to the reader. If the reader accepts the response, the tag was in state
S = 0, hence the selected tag is Tj. If the reader rejects the response, the tag was in
state S = 1, hence the selected tag is Ti. This phase is formalized by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 (Challenge phase)
A submits Ti and Tj as its challenge candidates.
A initiates communication with R using ReaderInit and obtains a challenge nr.
A relays R’s challenge nr to the selected tag T ∗.
A modiﬁes T ∗’s response (P, nt) to (P, nr) and sends it to R.
If R accepts the response, A guesses T ∗ = Tj, and otherwise guesses T
∗ = Ti.
Because this is a man-in-the-middle attack, it is plausible in a scenario where we
can assume that the attacker has simultaneous access to a legitimate reader and a
tag which is not in the reader’s vicinity. It works best if all or most tags are in state
S = 0, unless modiﬁed by an attacker. This implies that either there is only one
attacker modifying the tags’ states or that all attackers collude. The attacker would
put the tags to be traced in state S = 1 by querying each of them but not sending
the third protocol message. During the reconnaissance stage, when a tag is near
the attacker, the man-in-the-middle attack is performed by forwarding messages
between reader and tag. If the modiﬁcation of nt in the second protocol message
leads to a rejection by the reader, the attacker recognizes the tag.
4.2 The ﬂaw in the security analysis
To verify that the protocol satisﬁes the privacy deﬁnition stated in [19], all possible
interactions with the reader and tag functionalities must be considered.
The authors provide a security proof that the adversary can not determine ID
from the ﬁrst and second message with a non-negligible advantage using the tag
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functionality. However, the authors’ proof does not consider the reader functionality.
As shown above, using the reader functionality initiated with the ReaderInit
call the adversary has a non-negligible advantage to guess the selected tag. In fact,
the probability of correctly guessing the selected tag is 1.
A related ﬂaw was found by Avoine [3] in the protocol in [16]. Avoine breaks
untraceability of a tag by increasing the tag’s internal counter to an abnormal level
in order to recognize the tag later.
5 Desynchronization
The introduction of security notions such as untraceability and forward untraceability
has led to many new stateful protocols, e.g. [25,28,34,35,39]. Protocols that aim
to satisfy these requirements often update their secrets after a successful protocol
execution. Obviously, both reader and tag have to carry out the key update in order
to ensure that the reader will be able to authenticate the tag in future runs of the
protocol.
In a desynchronization attack the adversary aims to disrupt the key update leav-
ing the tag and reader in a desynchronized state and rendering future authentication
impossible.
The authors of HMNB observe that if the last message from the reader is not
received by the tag, the reader carries out an update of the key, but the tag does
not. To prevent desynchronization they propose that the reader keeps track of the
previous ID of every tag. Thus, during a run of the HMNB protocol, after receiving
a tag’s response to its challenge and in order to authenticate it, the reader searches
through all tags’ current ID values, as well as all tags’ previous ID values. We
show that this is insuﬃcient to prevent desynchronization.
5.1 The attack
Any tag that is in state S = 0 can be desynchronized from a reader by a man-in-
the-middle attack. In a communication between the reader and a tag, the adversary
intercepts and modiﬁes the reader’s challenge nr to any value nr′ = nr. The ad-
versary then sends the modiﬁed value to the tag and forwards all other messages
between reader and tag without modiﬁcation. Since in the case S = 0 the reader
does not verify that the tag received the correct value nr, the adversary’s modiﬁ-
cation goes by unnoticed. Thus, at the end of the protocol execution, reader and
tag update ID to diﬀerent values. The reader stores h(ID, nr), while the tag stores
h(ID, nr′). Therefore, the reader and tag will be in a desynchronized state and
future authentication of the tag becomes impossible. The attack is depicted in Fig-
ure 2. Note that HMNB’s safety measures intended to counteract desynchronization
do not allow for re-synchronization in this case, because the tag does not store the
previous value of ID and the reader does not know the value nr′ from which the
tag’s new ID is computed.
The attack described here is realistic if we assume that the attacker has simulta-
neous access to a reader and a tag which is not in the reader’s vicinity. Alternatively,
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ID
R E
ID
T
nonce nr
nr
nonce nr′
nr′
nonce nt
h(ID), nt
h(ID), nt
h(ID,nt)
h(ID,nt)
ID := h(ID,nr) ID := h(ID,nr′)
Fig. 2. Desynchronization attack on the HMNB protocol
it suﬃces that the attacker is able to successfully corrupt the ﬁrst message in the
protocol, for instance by emitting noise near the reader. The attacker could achieve
this by carrying a device that broadcasts interfering radio signals [18].
Desynchronizing a tag from the reader also compromises untraceability of the
tag. The adversary can obtain a challenge from the reader and use this challenge
to obtain a response from a tag. The adversary can then test the response against
the reader, which will reject the response if and only if the response came from
a desynchronized tag. Therefore, the adversary will always be able to recognize a
desynchronized tag.
5.2 The ﬂaw in the security analysis
The authors’ analysis of the protocol with respect to desynchronization only con-
siders attacks in which the adversary blocks certain messages. The analysis is split
up into two cases, the case where the adversary blocks the second message of the
protocol and the case where the adversary blocks the third message. While desyn-
chronization attacks are traditionally performed by blocking messages, there are
other possibilities to desynchronize a tag and a reader. In general, the successful
impersonation of a reader to a tag by an adversary can lead to desynchronization,
for instance because the tag updates its keys, ID, or other information to a value
that the reader is not able to compute. Another possibility is the selective or ran-
dom modiﬁcation of transmitted messages, as has been demonstrated in the attack
shown above.
Thus the ﬂaw in the authors’ security analysis consists of having considered only
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a speciﬁc attack on the desynchronization property, rather than giving a proof of
correctness for the property.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the security claims of an RFID protocol [14],
designed to achieve mutual authentication, strong privacy, and desynchronization
resistance, while limiting the computational cost for reader and tags. We have
presented a ﬂaw in the protocol which led to attacks on tag authentication, tag
untraceability, and desynchronization resistance. We have referred to other RFID
protocols suﬀering from the same authentication ﬂaw, but which to our knowledge
have not been noticed to be ﬂawed before. These protocols are discussed in a
technical report [7].
The attacks presented in this paper are diﬀerent from attacks on RFID protocols
previously described in the literature. For authentication vulnerabilities, attacks
typically focus on determining a tag’s or reader’s secret, or replaying messages
observed from previous communications between a tag and the reader. In the
present case, we have shown that it is suﬃcient to simply query a tag in order to
impersonate it and thus break authentication. The untraceability vulnerability is
non-standard, because state information is used which was leaked by the tag, while
traditionally an attacker attempts to fool the tag into reproducing a previously
seen message. Finally, while desynchronization attacks are commonly achieved by
blocking messages, here it was possible to desynchronize tag and reader through
a man-in-the-middle attack and forcing the tag and reader to carry out diﬀerent
updates.
We note that the authentication ﬂaw in HMNB could have been found using
automated veriﬁcation tools, e.g. [2,5]. Although automated veriﬁcation of untrace-
ability is still an open problem, the ﬂaws in the untraceability proof of HMNB and
several other protocols, recently [9,23,27,28,34,38,42], indicate a need for automated
veriﬁcation of this notion. Similarly, the introduction of stateful RFID protocols
and the resulting attacks, for instance on [20,34,38,42], call for a formal deﬁnition
and veriﬁcation of desynchronization resistance.
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